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Game Theory and the Law is a collection of previously published articles in which ideas from game theory and the economics of asymmetric information are applied to legal issues. Game theory's method is to simplify a situation by describing it in terms of players, actions, payoffs, after which the players' strategic interactions can be described. Whether used explicitly or implicitly, this is a highly useful approach to law. This important volume collects together the classic articles on the subject together with surveys of the approach and illustrative examples of the use of game theory in law.
Game Theory and the Law is a collection of previously published articles in which ideas from game theory and the economics of asymmetric information are applied to legal issues. Game theory's method is to simplify a situation by describing it in terms of players, actions, payoffs, after which the players' strategic interactions can be described. Whether used explicitly or implicitly, this is a highly useful approach to law. This important volume collects together the classic articles on the subject together with surveys of the approach and illustrative examples of the use of game theory in law.
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Eric B. Rasmusen
PART I GENERAL
1. Ian Ayres (1990), ‘Playing Games with the Law’
2. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Eric Rasmusen, Jeffrey Evans Stake, Robert
H. Heidt and Michael Alexeev (1997), ‘Review Dialogue: On Game
Theory and the Law’
3. Eric A. Posner (2000), ‘Agency Models in Law and Economics’
4. Franklin M. Fisher (1989), ‘Games Economists Play: A
Noncooperative View’
PART II BARGAINING AND PROCEDURE
5. Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1989), ‘Economic
Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’
6. I.P.L. P’ng (1983), ‘Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and
Trial’
7. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘Settlement,
Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs’
8. Lucien Arye Bebchuk (1996), ‘A New Theory Concerning the
Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue’
9. Keith N. Hylton (1994), ‘An Economic Theory of the Duty to
Bargain’
10. Ian Ayres (1991), ‘Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination
in Retail Car Negotiations’
PART III CONTRACTS
11. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner (1992), ‘Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules’
12. Eric B. Rasmusen (2001), ‘Explaining Incomplete Contracts as
the Result of Contract-Reading Costs’
13. J. Mark Ramseyer (1991), ‘Legal Rules in Repeated Deals:
Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan’
PART IV TORTS, CRIME, AND TAXES
14. John Prather Brown (1973), ‘Toward an Economic Theory of
Liability’
15. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che (1991), ‘Decoupling
Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’
16. Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde
(1986), ‘The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of
Law Enforcement’
17. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), ‘The Economic
Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’
PART V COURTS
18. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (1984), ‘The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation’
19. Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller (1990), ‘A Rational Choice
Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to
the “State Farm” and “Grove City” Cases’
20. Frank H. Easterbrook (1988), ‘Stability and Reliability in
Judicial Decisions’
Name Index
Edited by Eric B. Rasmusen, Dan R. and Catherine M. Dalton Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, US
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