This textbook reflects the increasing importance in economic research and teaching of the non-cooperative game theory and information economics. Eric Rasmusen begins by laying out the theory of non-cooperative games from a user's viewpoint, introducing definitions and technical results only in so far as they are useful to the student or applied modeller. The book goes on to outline the basic models of incomplete information used in current economic research. The second and larger part of the book is devoted to applications of game theory, presenting many models which have so far been available only in widely dispersed sources. Individual chapters concentrate on auctions, moral hazard, adverse selection, signalling, reputation, bargaining and oligopoly. This text is designed for US microeconomics graduates, UK third year and graduates in microeconomics, specialists in the game theory and information economics, sociologists, and scientists of politics and law.
This textbook reflects the increasing importance in economic research and teaching of the non-cooperative game theory and information economics. Eric Rasmusen begins by laying out the theory of non-cooperative games from a user's viewpoint, introducing definitions and technical results only in so far as they are useful to the student or applied modeller. The book goes on to outline the basic models of incomplete information used in current economic research. The second and larger part of the book is devoted to applications of game theory, presenting many models which have so far been available only in widely dispersed sources. Individual chapters concentrate on auctions, moral hazard, adverse selection, signalling, reputation, bargaining and oligopoly. This text is designed for US microeconomics graduates, UK third year and graduates in microeconomics, specialists in the game theory and information economics, sociologists, and scientists of politics and law.
Introduction ; PART I: GAME THEORY ; 1. The Rules of the Game, and the Equilibrium of Concept ; (1) Basic Definitions (2) Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner's Dilemma (3) Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea (4) Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, the Battle of the Sexes, and Pure Coordination (5) Focal Points ; 2. Information ; (1) Introduction (2) The Normal and Extensive Forms of a Game (3) Information Sets (4) Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information (5) Bayesian Games and the Harsanyi Transformation (6) Example: The Png Settlement Game ; 3. Continuous and Mixed Strategies ; (1) Introduction (2) Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game (3) "Chicken", "The War of Attrition", and Correlated Strategies (4) Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game ; 4. Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information ; (1) Introduction (2) Subgame Perfectness (3) An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I (4) Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox (5) Discounting (6) Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem (7) Reputation: The One-Sided Prisoner's Dilemma (8) Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game ; 5. Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information ; (1) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III (2) Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: "PhD Admissions." (3) The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V (4) Incomplete Information in the Prisoner's Dilemma: The Gang of Four Model (5) The Axelrod Tournament (6) Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game (7) Existence of Equilibrium ; Part II: Asymmetric Information ; 6. Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions ; (1) Categories of Asymmetric Information Models (2) A Principal-Agent Model: The Production Game (3) The Self Selection, Participation, and Competition Constrains (4) State-Space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II (5) Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game (6) Institutions ; 7. Moral Hazard: Hidden Information and Remedies ; (1) Pooling vs Separating Equilibrium, and the Revelation Principle (2) An Example: The Salesman Game (3) Efficiency Wages (4) Tournaments (5) Monitoring (6) Alleviating the Agency Problem (7) Teams, and the Groves Mechanism ; 8. Adverse Selection ; (1) Introdution: Production Game V (2) Adverse Selection Under Certainty: Lemons I and II (3) Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons III and IV (4) Adverse Selection Under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III (5) Other Equilibrium Concepts: Wilson and Reactive Equilibrium (6) Applications ; 9. Signalling ; (1) Introduction (2) The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling (3) General comments on Signalling in Education (4) The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening (5) Two Signals: Underpricing of Stock ; Part III: Other Applications ; 10. Bargaining ; (1) The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie (2) The Nash Bargaining Solution (3) Alternating Offers Over Finite Time (4) Alternating Offers Over Infinite Time.
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