Table of Contents

Acknowledgments 1. Cognitive Science Is Not Cognitive Psychology 2. The Dilemma of Mental Causality Mental States as Higher Level Properties Privileged Regularities and Ceteris Paribus Clauses Screening off Causes Ignoring the Realism/Antirealism Debate 3. Hierarchies in the Brain The Neuron The Methodological Individualism/Anti-Individualism Debate Hierarchies in Neuroscience "Privileged" Causality in Neuroscience Explanation in Cognitive Science 4. Computationalism and Functional Analysis: A Pragmatic Approach Formal Accounts of Computationalism Computational Satisfaction and True Computation Functionalism and Functional Analysis Philosophical Functionalism An Example The Function/Structure Distinction 5. Reductionism in the Cognitive Sciences Reductionism in Philosophy of Mind Arguments against Reductionism Cognitive Theories of Emotion: A Test Case Explanatory Extension 6. The Dual Memory Hypothesis and the Structure of Interdisciplinary Theories Developmental Studies for a Dual Processing System The Distinction between Implicit and Explicit Memory Neural Evidence for the Dual Memory Hypothesis The Theoretical Framework "Two-Part" Interdisciplinary Theories Putting It All Together 7. Interdisciplinary Theories and Bridge Sciences: The Case of Event Related Potentials The Challenge ERPs The Timing of Priming Bridge Sciences Appendix: Cognitive Science and the Semantic View Notes References Index

About the Author

Valerie Gray Hardcastle is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.